Robert Mugabe, who has brought only desolation to Zimbabwe, looks more vulnerable now than for many years. One veteran observer of the country urges Europe and Africa to prepare together for life after his demise, while Britain must accept its share of the blame for his tyrannical rule

At long last, it appears that Robert Mugabe's days may be numbered. He has destroyed Zimbabwe's economy, the source of the patronage which has helped keep the Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) afloat for the past 10 years, and his options are rapidly narrowing. But the game is not yet over. What we are now witnessing is a struggle for survival by a man who seems willing to bring the whole edifice down around his ears. Mugabe has convinced himself that the normal rules of political life do not apply to him. As the "Father of the Nation", and the man who brought liberation to his people and led the Front Line States in their opposition to apartheid South Africa, he believes he has a right to depart from office at a time and in the manner of his own choosing.

For some time, Mugabe's allies have suggested that the old man would be willing to leave but only with his "dignity" intact. Unfortunately, not only for him but for the country as a whole, he seems to have left it too late for that. Mugabe's failure to get the ruling party to underwrite plans to extend his tenure to 2010 has left him weakened and angry. Certainly the party bigwigs Solomon Mujuru and Emmerson Mnangagwa, as well as Zimbabwe's neighbours, want to see the back of Mugabe. The President, however, remains a consummate political operator and will try again to neutralise internal party opposition by playing one faction off against another. Talk of these factions coming together successfully to dictate to Mugabe should be treated with caution. Mugabe has also consistently outwitted the South Africans.

None of the people jockeying for his position appears either strong enough or reliable enough to guarantee Mugabe's security - even were he willing to fade into obscurity. One option involves him leaving the country (possibly for Namibia). Such a humiliation is not something the "Father of the Nation" would countenance. The alternative of toughing it out, therefore, even for an obscure and possibly disastrous future, may remain in his view the least bad option: it also means that he can exploit any new opportunities that might arise.

It would be a mistake to write Mugabe out of the script prematurely. He still has supporters in the intelligence and security apparatus and control of the party bureaucracy. In many rural areas, he is both feared and respected. Mugabe remains a powerful opponent - eloquent, well briefed and often plausible, a brilliant tactician, if a lousy strategist.

How did we reach such a sorry situation after Mugabe's early promise of reconciliation and peace? Although, of course, the primary villain is Mugabe himself, who has been in control of the country since 1980, nobody comes out of this unhappy tale with much credit - including the former colonial power. It is important to remember our own responsibility for the mess. New Labour politicians like to believe that history began when Tony Blair entered Downing Street. Clare Short talking about the country's land problems famously told Mugabe that, being Irish, she wasn't responsible for Zimbabwe's colonial past.

Many of Zimbabwe's problems can be traced back to our own failures. The unwillingness of the Wilson Government to deal with UDI - surrendering to the British people's misplaced solidarity with white kith and kin - created the conditions for the armed struggle which helped form Zimbabwe's undemocratic political culture and Mugabe's hankering for a one-party state. The liberation struggle, eclipsing leaders engaged in peaceful campaigning, created parties shaped around the military culture of top-down command. Britain's dilatoriness also reinforced deep racial tensions, which in later years Mugabe could exploit for his own short-term political ends.

The Lancaster House agreement, which determined the structure of independent Zimbabwe, was only accepted by the liberation movements under duress. It deliberately foreclosed the option of fundamental economic restructuring and far-reaching land reforms (whether or not these would have been prudent or, indeed, whether or not the liberation movements really intended to implement them). It helped focus the minds of Mugabe and his lieutenants on securing control of the state in order to protect the country's hard won "sovereignty". Mugabe insisted from the time he took office that gaining political power did not represent final victory, and the next job was to win control of the economy.

The lesson ZANU-PF drew from Lancaster House was that what mattered most was not a democratic mandate (who cared at Lancaster House what the majority of Zimbabweans wanted?) but the ability to assert, consolidate and defend "the party's" power. This involved, in the first instance, neutralising Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), the only credible threat to ZANU- PF's hegemony. Britain, with an in-country military training presence (and intelligence capacity), looked the other way as Mugabe implemented the violent Gukurahundi anti-insurgency campaign in Matabeleland and the Midlands (1982-87), costing the lives of some 20,000 civilians. There was not a whimper from the Foreign Office while all this was going on, under then Minister of State Security Mnangagwa. The moral was clear. Provided you are "on side", the great powers will turn a blind eye to human rights abuses. Political power won by violent means was consolidated through violence.

Defeat in the February 2000 referendum on the Constitution saw tensions intensify between ZANU-PF and the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) - supported by disgruntled trade unionists, white farmers and academics - and between civil society bodies and the Government, and the deterioration in the human rights situation accelerated. Land invasions, supported at least emotionally by many Zimbabweans, began soon after the referendum was lost. Previously such initiatives had been resisted but, no doubt keen to tap new sources of popular support, and also to punish white farmers for their support of the MDC, ZANU-PF encouraged the land invasions and murders by so-called "war veterans". The "fast track" resettlement programme stoked up intense racial animosity.

Once the regime, buffeted by internal, regional and global crises, came under serious internal threat from the MDC, Tony Blair adopted an approach which could easily be characterised as one of "regime change". Internally and within Africa as a whole, the ageing Zimbabwean autocrat managed to characterise this policy as part of a seamless narrative of Western imperialism. Nonsense or not, and however self-serving, for a long period Mugabe won the propaganda battle at home and in Africa, and no credible African leader (except, for a period, Nelson Mandela) was willing to call his bluff.

The courageous leaders of the MDC proved no match against a ruthless political operator able to deploy and manipulate all the levers of state power and patronage to secure his own survival. Critically, many within Zimbabwe's political class - sceptical about the quality of the opposition and convinced that change would have to come from within ZANU-PF - failed to adhere to the MDC. The ruling party did not split and no significant leaders transferred allegiance to the opposition. The reformist faction within ZANU-PF decided to bide its time. Not surprisingly, therefore, there was never a sense that power was slipping from Mugabe's grasp. At least, not until now.

The MDC, lately fractious and dispirited - until Mugabe's brutality managed to focus international attention on Zimbabwe and give new impetus to the opposition - suffers from many of the weaknesses of the ruling party. The quality of leadership leaves a good deal to be desired, as does its focus on mobilising international pressure rather than building its internal organisation. The onslaught against civil society and the media and flagrant disregard for the rule of law make it difficult for democratic forces to operate.

The courage of those opposition leaders who were recently attacked so viciously by the police has again exposed the oppressive nature of the Government. As Zimbabwe falls apart it is easy to condemn the evil tyrant and encourage the masses to take to the barricades. There is no guarantee, however, that such a policy will produce other than increased chaos. It is important to encourage ZANU-PF and MDC leaders to agree on a strategy for the transition to credible democratic elections; and to support those, including the Centre for Peace Initiatives in Africa, who are working to encourage dialogue aimed at fundamental constitutional reform.

At last, the African Union (AU) and the South African Government have begun to change their tone on Zimbabwe. This is to be welcomed, even if it is too little, too late. The European Union should now move to fashion a common approach uniting its efforts with those of key African leaders. To this end, it must be made clear that we recognise our own responsibilities for this crisis; that we are in no way motivated by a desire to impose on Zimbabwe any particular government or political system; and that there will be a positive response, diplomatic and financial, to efforts made in good faith to stabilise the economy and open up political space for the opposition.

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